How Law Enforcement Changed Messages & How To Fight Back
AN0M was supposed to be secure encrypted messaging. But the FBI secretly built a backdoor into every message. They could read, modify, and delete anything you sent - and you would never know. Even worse: by the time evidence reaches court, you can't prove it was changed. BUT - there IS a way to fight back.
When you use AN0M, something secret happens. The app creates a hidden copy of every message you send and sends it to a secret FBI bot contact that you can't see. This copy goes to law enforcement servers, not to your friend.
This is the technical flow. It's simple but devastating:
| Stage | What Happens | Who Controls It? |
|---|---|---|
| 1. You Type A Message | "I will see you today" | You |
| 2. App Creates Secret Copy | Hidden ghost bot gets the same message | FBI (they built the app) |
| 3. Both Sent Encrypted | Message + secret copy both encrypted | You (using keys FBI gave you) |
| 4. Your Friend Gets Original | Receives: "I will see you today" â | Your Friend |
| 5. FBI Gets Secret Copy | Ghost bot server in Europe collects it | FBI |
| 6. FBI Decrypts It | Uses master key to read: "I will see you today" | FBI |
| 7. FBI CHANGES IT | Modifies to: "I will give you 200kg today" | FBI â THIS IS THE CRIME |
| 8. FBI Re-encrypts It | Encrypted with FBI's key | FBI |
| 9. Stored In Database | The FAKE message is now in FBI's database | FBI |
| 10. Goes To Court | Evidence presented: "I will give you 200kg today" | Police |
UPDATE: The 2024 court ruling was made OFFICIAL in October 2025 by the High Court. But there's a dark twist - Parliament changed the law AFTER the case was granted special leave to appeal to prevent the courts from potentially ruling against the AFP.
The Law: Evidence must be authenticated to show it is what it claims to be.
Why AN0M Evidence Fails: The prosecution cannot authenticate AN0M messages because:
The Law: A statement made outside of court, offered to prove the truth of the matter, is hearsay and inadmissible (unless an exception applies).
Why AN0M Evidence Is Hearsay:
The Law: Physical or digital evidence must have an unbroken chain of custody showing every person who handled it and what they did.
Why AN0M Evidence Fails Chain of Custody:
The Law: Defendants have the constitutional right to confront the witnesses against them.
Why AN0M Evidence Violates This Right:
When police raid a device, they use Cellebrite UFED (Universal Forensic Extraction Device) to extract data. But here's the smoking gun: Australian police SEIZED devices but performed NO forensic extraction. All evidence comes from FBI servers. Even worse, the Cellebrite UFDR files presented to court are not original device data - they are curated subsets with zero integrity protection.
VERIFIED FACT - This is the single most damaging issue for the prosecution: Australian police seized defendants' devices during raids but NEVER performed forensic extraction on them. All ~390 Operation Ironside cases rely 100% on unverified FBI server records.
â ïļ This violates the most basic rule of evidence law: Chain of custody. The prosecution cannot link the defendant's DEVICE to the messages in the FBI DATABASE.
CRITICAL FORENSIC ISSUE: The UFDR files presented to courts are NOT the original device data. They are deliberately curated subsets created by Cellebrite examiner, with prosecution choosing what data to include or exclude:
â ïļ THIS IS THE SMOKING GUN: UFDR files are not forensic evidence - they are prosecution-curated reports. Examiner could include messages showing guilt while excluding messages showing innocence. There is zero cryptographic link between the UFDR file content and what was actually on the device. Court has no way to verify the UFDR represents complete or authentic device data.
VERIFIED FACT: Cellebrite UFDR files are designed as viewable reports, NOT secure forensic evidence. They are completely unprotected and editable:
ðĄ What Legitimate Forensic Evidence SHOULD Have: Cryptographic hashes, digital signatures, encryption at rest, audit logs, immutable storage. UFDR files have NONE of these. This is why they're designed as viewer reports, NOT as legal evidence. Yet prosecution is using them to convict people.
TECHNICAL VULNERABILITY: AN0M platform required device identification. Android 10+ prevents apps from reading actual IMEI. AFP/FBI-controlled servers assigned identification numbers - these could be added AFTER device seizure:
â ïļ CRITICAL: AN0M platform was imperfect (as police files show GPS location recording sometimes failed). The system could have: assigned wrong identification numbers, linked devices incorrectly, or added identifiers long after devices were seized. There is ZERO way for defense to verify when or how IMEI/identification data was added to the database.
VERIFIED FACT: The seized devices remain under exclusive police/prosecution control with ZERO independent oversight. This is fundamentally unfair to defendants:
â ïļ This is the opposite of fair trial: In any fair criminal process, defendants can examine evidence against them. Here, defendants cannot even TOUCH the devices they allegedly used. Prosecution has complete unilateral control and claims they know what's on them. This violates fundamental fairness and Section 136 of the Evidence Act.
CRITICAL: The prosecution's case rests on assuming seized devices sent messages that appear in FBI's database. But there is ZERO forensic evidence linking device to database:
ðĻ THIS IS THE FOUNDATION OF THE CASE, AND IT'S COMPLETELY ABSENT: The most basic rule of criminal evidence requires linking a defendant to the alleged conduct through tangible evidence. Here, the prosecution cannot prove defendants' devices were involved in AN0M at all. Without forensic examination of devices, the prosecution cannot prove defendants' devices were involved in AN0M at all. Without access to FBI's original data, defendants cannot verify messages haven't been fabricated. Without integrity protection on the database, the messages could have been inserted at any time. The prosecution's entire case is built on an unverifiable assumption backed by Parliament's retroactive law.
This is what actually happened in 2025:
Defendants challenged whether AN0M evidence was unlawfully intercepted under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979.
AFTER the High Court granted special leave to appeal, Parliament passed the Surveillance Legislation (Confirmation of Application) Act 2024.
CD and TB (the defendants) then challenged the validity of the new Act, arguing:
In October 2025, the High Court ruled (unanimously) that the Act was valid.
Separation of Powers Violation: Parliament passed a law specifically designed to prevent courts from potentially ruling against the government. This:
Future governments now know they can:
The court MUST exclude evidence that is so unreliable it could harm justice. The court must consider:
⥠THE KEY: AN0M evidence + Cellebrite UFDR evidence fails ALL of these criteria. The court MUST exercise its discretion under s.135 - regardless of what Parliament said.
The court may limit how evidence is given if it would cause unfairness to the accused. AN0M and Cellebrite evidence causes unfairness because:
The High Court's 2025 decision acknowledged (even while upholding Parliament's law) that there are "concerns regarding the institutional integrity of courts." This means judges can still refuse to accept evidence that compromises justice, even if technically admissible.
Here's the critical point: Parliament changed the law to say AN0M evidence was "lawfully obtained." But Parliament CANNOT change the Evidence Act sections about reliability and unfairness. Section 135 and 136 still apply:
File a discovery request and motion demanding:
If police refuse = evidence is ABSOLUTELY INADMISSIBLE under s.135 and s.138A (failure to provide evidence to support chain of custody).
Argue that even though the High Court upheld it, the law:
Motion to exclude evidence as unreliable:
You need multiple experts to testify:
Call the actual recipient of messages to testify:
Show why courts should be skeptical: